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Abstract
A credal network under epistemic irrelevance is a generalised version of a Bayesian network that
loosens its two main building blocks. On the one hand, the local probabilities do not have to be
specified exactly. On the other hand, the assumptions of independence do not have to hold exactly.
Conceptually, these credal networks are elegant and useful. However, in practice, they have long
remained very hard to work with, both theoretically and computationally. This paper provides a
general introduction to this type of credal networks and presents some promising new theoretical
developments that were recently proved using sets of desirable gambles and lower previsions. We
explain these developments in terms of probabilities and expectations, thereby making them more
easily accessible to the Bayesian network community.
Keywords: credal networks; epistemic irrelevance; irrelevant natural extension; sets of probabili-
ties; lower expectation.
1. Introduction
Bayesian networks (Pearl, 1988) owe their succes to the main feature that all probabilistic graph-
ical models have in common: they are able to model the uncertainty that is associated with large
multivariate problems in a manageable way, by combining local uncertainty models with intuitive
graph-based independence assumptions. For a Bayesian network, the independence assumptions are
derived from a directed acyclic graph and the local uncertainty models are probability distributions.
Credal networks (Cozman, 2000, 2005; Antonucci et al., 2014) generalize this concept by re-
placing the local probability distributions with closed convex sets of probability distributions, also
called credal sets. In this way, they do not require the exact specification of all the local proba-
bilities, but allow the user to provide partial constraints on them, such as intervals or inequalities.
Depending on the type of credal network that is being considered, the independence assumptions
that are derived from the graph are also generalised, by replacing them with weaker types of inde-
pendence assessments. This paper focusses on credal networks that adopt epistemic irrelevance as
their notion of independence, called credal networks under epistemic irrelevance.
To the best of our knowledge, this particular type of credal network was first introduced by
Cozman in 1998, be it under a different name—locally defined Quasi-Bayesian network. Now,
almost twenty years later, it is firmly established as one of the two main types of credal networks.
However, compared with the other main type, which adopts strong independence as its notion of
independence, credal networks under epistemic irrelevance have received relatively little attention.
Initial work on credal networks under epistemic irrelevance adopted the framework of proba-
bilities (Cozman, 1998, 2000; de Campos and Cozman, 2007) and, as such, remained close to the
theory of Bayesian networks. In contrast, more recent work uses other, closely related frameworks
for modelling uncertainty, such as lower previsions and sets of desirable gambles (de Cooman et al.,
2010; Benavoli et al., 2011; De Bock and de Cooman, 2014, 2015). However, unfortunately, these
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G = {p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w}
Π (s) = {r, t}
C(s) = {u}
D(s) = {u, v}
N(s) = {p, q, w}
ΠN(s) = {p, q, r, t, w}
K = {r, s, u}
Π (K) = {q, t}
C(K) = {v}
D(K) = {v}
N(s) = {p, w}
ΠN(s) = {p, q, t, w}
Figure 1: A simple illustration of several important concepts in this paper.
frameworks are not very well known within the Bayesian network community, and as a direct result,
recent work on credal networks under epistemic irrelevance is rather inaccessible to this community.
The aim of this paper is to (re)introduce credal networks under epistemic irrelevance to the
Bayesian network community, and to present the most recent theoretical developments in this field in
a way that is easily accessible, using the language of probabilities and expectations; lower previsions
and sets of desirable gambles are mentioned only in passing. Proofs are not provided, because these
do require extensive use of these other frameworks for modelling uncertainty. For a more detailed,
technical exposition, which does include proofs, and which also presents a number of algorithms,
the interested reader is referred to (De Bock, 2015).
2. The Basics of Credal Networks
Basically, a credal network is just a special type of multivariate uncertainty model for a finite set of
variables {Xs}s∈G, withG some finite index set. Each of the variablesXs takes values xs in a finite
set Xs and, for any S ⊆ G, we use XS to denote the vector that consists of the variables {Xs}s∈S ,
which takes values xS in XS := ×s∈SXs.
In a credal network, just like in a Bayesian network, the variables {Xs}s∈G are identified with
their indices s ∈ G. These indices are then interpreted as the nodes of a directed acyclic graph—see
Figure 1 for an example—and the arrows of this graph are taken to represent—some type of—
(in)dependencies among the individual variables. Finally, these assessments of independence are
combined with local uncertainty models, and in this way, a global uncertainty model for XG is
defined. The main difference with a Bayesian network is that the local and global uncertainty
models are now sets of probability distributions.
In order to formalize this idea, we need some basic graph-theoretic concepts, which are il-
lustrated in Figure 1. For two nodes s and u in G, if there is a directed edge from s to u, we
denote this as s → u and say that s is a parent of u and u is a child of s. For any node s,
its set of parents is denoted by Π (s) and its set of children by C(s). A node s is said to pre-
cede a node v, denoted by s v v, if it is possible to start from s and follow the edges of the
graph along their direction to reach v. If s v v and s 6= v, we say that s strictly precedes
v and write s @ v. For any node s, we call D(s) := {v ∈ G : s @ v} its set of descendants
and N(s) := G \ (Π (s) ∪ {s} ∪D(s)) its set of non-parent non-descendants. We also use the
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shorthand notation ΠN(s) := Π (s) ∪N(s) = G \ ({s} ∪D(s)) to refer to what we call the non-
descendants of s. With this terminology in place, we can now formally introduce the two main
building blocks of a credal network, which are local uncertainty models and assessments of inde-
pendence.
The basic premise of a credal network is that it is sometimes unrealistic to provide exact values
for the local probabilities P (xs | xΠ (s)) that are required to specify a Bayesian network. Therefore,
in those cases, the local uncertainty models of a credal network are taken to be sets of probability
distributions. For every variable Xs and every instantiation xΠ (s) of its parent variables XΠ (s), the
associated local uncertainty model is a setMs|xΠ (s) of probability mass functions on Xs, the ele-
ments of which are regarded as candidates for some ideal—but unknown—conditional probability
mass function P (Xs | xΠ (s)), in the sense that
P (Xs | xΠ (s)) ∈Ms|xΠ (s) for all s ∈ G and xΠ (s) ∈ XΠ (s). (1)
Most authors require the sets Ms|xΠ (s) to be closed and convex, and then call them credal sets;
we will follow this convention here as well. In practice, these credal sets are elicited from experts,
learned from data, or constructed as some type of neighbourhood model. We do not discuss these
practical aspects here, but assume that the local credal sets are given.
The second building block of a credal network is a collection of independence assessments. As
in Bayesian networks, these independence assessments are inferred from the graph of the network in
the following way: every variable Xs is assumed to be conditionally independent of its non-parent
non-descendants XN(s) given its parents XΠ (s). However, in the context of sets of probability
distributions, there is no consensus on what is meant here by independence. Depending on the
notion of independence that is chosen, a different type of credal network is obtained.
3. Credal Networks under Complete Independence
The most straightforward way to define independence for a set of distributions, is to simply impose
the usual notion of independence, which we will henceforth call stochastic independence, to each of
its elements P (XG). This type of independence—element-wise stochastic independence—is called
complete independence. In the case of credal networks, this results in the following assessment:
P (Xs | xΠN(s)) = P (Xs | xΠ (s)) for all s ∈ G and xΠN(s) ∈ XΠN(s). (2)
Conventionally, the conditional probabilities in this expression are taken to be derived from P (XG)
through Bayes’s rule. However, this creates issues in the case of probability zero; for example, if
P (xΠN(s)) = 0, then P (Xs | xΠN(s)) is ill-defined.
In order to avoid these issues in an elegant yet rigorous way, we will not regard conditional
probabilities as derived concepts that are obtained through Bayes’s rule, but rather as primitive
notions that are part of a (full) conditional probability measure (Dubins, 1975).
Definition 1 A full conditional probability measure P on a finite set Ω is a map
P : P(Ω)× P∅(Ω)→ R : (A,B)→ P (A |B),
with P∅(Ω) := P(Ω) \ {∅}, such that for any A,C ∈ P(Ω) and B ∈ P∅(Ω):
F1: P ( · |B) is a probability measure on P(Ω) with P (B|B) = 1;
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F2: P (A ∩ C|B) = P (A|C ∩B)P (C|B) if C ∩B 6= ∅.
The axioms F1 and F2 correspond to the usual rules of probability. The only difference is that
Bayes’s rule—F2—does not define conditional probabilities by means of division, but instead re-
gards them as primitive notions and requires them to satisfy a product rule.
In the case of a credal network, we model the uncertainty about XG by means of a—possibly
partially specified—full conditional probability measure P on XG. For any event A ∈ P(XG)
and any non-empty event B ∈ P∅(XG), P (A|B) is the probability of A conditional on B and
P (A) := P (A|XG) is the (unconditional) probability of A. We will mostly focus on events of the
form {zG ∈ XG : zS = xS}, with S ⊆ G; for ease of notation, we denote these events as xS . The
events xs, xΠ (s), xΠN(s), xG and x∅ = XG correspond to special cases.
Within this framework, Equation (2) is now simply a constraint on the full conditional probabil-
ity measure P and does not require—nor suffers from—divisions by zero. As is very well known
from the theory of Bayesian networks, this constraint implies that the unconditional global proba-
bilities P (xG) are completely determined by the local probabilities P (xs | xΠ (s)):
P (xG) =
∏
s∈G
P (xs | xΠ (s)) for all xG ∈ XG.
This is not necessarily true for conditional probabilities. For example, there may be some S, T ⊆ G,
xS ∈ XS and xT ∈ XT such that P (xS | xT ) is not uniquely determined by Equation (2) and the
local probabilities. However, this is usually ignored; the theory of Bayesian networks focusses on
cases where P (xT ) > 0, which guarantees that P (xS | xT ) can be computed by means of Bayes’s
rule—F2. This restricted focus is unfortunate because, even if xT has probability zero, P (xS | xT )
is often still uniquely determined by the local probabilities and Equation (2).
In any case, for credal networks, probability zero is not the only source of non-uniqueness. In-
deed, the local probabilities may themselves not be unique, because Equation (1) will in general—
unless all the local credal sets are singletons—only impose partial constraints on the local proba-
bilities. Due to this inherent non-uniqueness, a credal network does not correspond to a single full
conditional probability measure, but rather to a set of them. We will denote such a set of full condi-
tional probability measures on XG by FG, and for any B ∈ P∅(XG) and any S ⊆ G, we will then
use FG(XS |B) to refer to the set of probability mass functions {P (XS |B) : P ∈ FG}. The sets
FG(Xs | xΠ (s)), FG(Xs | xΠN(s)) and FG(XG) := FG(XG | XG) correspond to important special
cases.
The largest set of (full conditional) probability measures that is compatible with the defining
constraints of a credal network is called its extension. For a credal network under complete inde-
pendence, these defining constraints are Equations (1) and (2), and the corresponding extension is
called the complete extension. We will denote this complete extension by FcomG . Clearly, if we let
F∗G be the set of all full conditional probability measures on XG, then FcomG is given by
FcomG =
{
P ∈ F∗G :
(∀s ∈ G) (∀xΠN(s) ∈ XΠN(s))
P (Xs | xΠN(s)) = P (Xs | xΠ (s)) ∈Ms|xΠ (s)
}
. (3)
If we make abstraction of the ‘full conditional’ aspects that we have added, and focus on the un-
conditional part FcomG (XG), then this complete extension is simply the set of all Bayesian networks
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whose local probability mass functions P (Xs | xΠ (s)) take values in the local credal setsMs|xΠ (s) .
This approach is highly intuitive if one is convinced that the uncertainty about XG can be modelled
by means of a single Bayesian network and, for some reason, the required local probability mass
functions are not exactly known, but are only partially specified. It seems reasonable to model this
type of situation by means of a set of Bayesian models, and it should therefore not be surprising
that credal networks under complete independence were the first type of credal network to be con-
sidered; see (Fagiuoli and Zaffalon, 1998). In fact, at that point in time, there were no other types,
and credal networks under complete independence were simply called credal networks.
Nevertheless, today, rather surprisingly, credal networks under complete independence are al-
most never considered. Instead, the majority of work on credal networks considers what are called
credal networks under strong independence. We will not go into details here; for our present pur-
poses, it suffices to know that the unconditional part F strG (XG) of the extension of a credal network
under strong independence, which is caled the strong extension of the network, is equal to the con-
vex hull of the unconditional part FcomG (XG) of the complete extension. Given the choice between
these two extensions, I favour the complete extension, because of its clear and intuitive sensitivity
analysis interpretation, which the strong extension does not have. I fail to understand why most
authors prefer the strong extension instead. In any case, the choice is mainly a philosophical one,
because in practice, there is little difference between the two approaches. Essentially, Fagiuoli and
Zaffalon (1998, Theorem 5) already showed that for many commonly considered parameters of
interest—such as (conditional) lower and upper probabilities and expectations—it makes no dif-
ference whether we compute them with respect to the complete extension or its convex hull—the
strong extension. Hence, most of the algorithms that have been developed for strong extensions can
be applied to complete extensions as well.
4. Credal Networks under Epistemic Irrelevance
In this paper, we do not impose complete or strong independence, but instead impose the following
assessments of epistemic irrelevance:
FG(Xs | xΠ (s)) = FG(Xs | xΠN(s)) for all s ∈ G and xΠN(s) ∈ XΠN(s). (4)
The idea here is that since we are modelling uncertainty by means of sets of (full conditional)
probability measures, independence should be a statement about such sets, not about the individual
elements of these sets. Equation (4) imposes that given the value xΠ (s) of its parents, our beliefs
about the variable Xs remain identical if we are also given the value xN(s) of its non-parent non-
descendants. The only difference with the more conventional notions of—stochastic, complete
or strong—independence lies in the fact that beliefs are now no longer identified with individual
probability distributions, but rather with the information that is available about these distributions,
that is, with sets of probabilities.
By combining our assessments of epistemic irrelevance with the assessments that are imposed
by the local credal sets, we obtain a credal network under epistemic irrelevance. The largest set FG
of full conditional probability measures on XG that satisfies these two assessments—Equations (1)
and (4)—is called the irrelevant natural extension of a credal network. We will denote this exten-
sion by F irrG . As shown in (Cozman, 2000) under strict positivity conditions, and more generally
in (De Bock, 2015), F irrG is given by
F irrG =
{
P ∈ F∗G :
(∀s ∈ G) (∀xΠN(s) ∈ XΠN(s)) P (Xs | xΠN(s)) ∈Ms|xΠ (s)}. (5)
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If we compare this expression with Equation (3), we see that the defining assessments of a credal net-
work under epistemic irrelevance are less stringent than those of a credal network under complete—
or strong—independence. Actually, it can be shown that FcomG satisfies the epistemic irrelevance
assessments in Equation (4). However, the converse is not true: the full conditional probability mea-
sures in F irrG do not need to satisfy Equation (2). In other words, a credal network under epistemic
irrelevance does not impose stochastic independence: P (Xs | xΠN(s)) may vary as xN(s) changes,
as long as it remains within the local credal setMs|xΠ (s) . In this sense, epistemic irrelevance im-
poses a notion of ‘almost’ stochastic independence, which, in those applications where stochastic
independence is an approximation that is imposed out of mathematical convenience, can provide a
more realistic alternative.
From a practical point of view, the main object of interest is not the irrelevant natural extension
F irrG itself, but rather the corresponding bounds on some parameters of interest, such as probabil-
ities and expected values. The most important such bounds are tight lower and upper bounds on
conditional expectations E(f(XS) | B) :=
∑
xS∈XS f(xS)P (xS | B), where f belongs to the setG(XS) of all real-valued functions on XS , with S a subset of G, and where B ∈ P∅(XG) is a non-
empty event. The tightest lower bound on this conditional expectation is the lower expectation of
f , defined by
EirrG (f(XS) |B) := inf
{
E(f(XS) |B) : P ∈ F irrG
}
. (6)
The upper expectation EirrG (f(XG) |B) can be defined analogously, simply by replacing the infi-
mum with a supremum. However, because EirrG (f(XS) |B) = −EirrG (−f(XS) |B), it suffices to
focus on lower expectations. Lower and upper probabilities are defined similarly, but these too will
not be our main focus, because they correspond to the special case where f is the indicator IA of
an event A ∈ P(XG), defined by IA(xG) := 1 if xG ∈ A and IA(xG) := 0 otherwise. Indeed,
since P (A | B) is clearly equal to E(IA(XG) | B), it follows that the conditional lower probabil-
ity P irrG (A | B) := inf
{
P (A |B) : P ∈ F irrG
}
is equal to EirrG (IA(XG) | B), and similarly for the
conditional upper probability P irrG (A |B). Unconditional lower and upper expectations and proba-
bilities are obtained by choosing B = XG, in which case we will drop the conditional event from
the notation, for example by writing EirrG (f(XG)) instead of E
irr
G (f(XG) | XG).
Since all the other bounds can be easily derived from them, algorithmic efforts can focus on
computing EirrG (f(XG) | B), which, as can be seen from Equations (5) and (6), requires solving
a large optimisation problem. If the local models Ms|xΠ (s) are described by linear constraints,
this optimisation problem can be solved by means of linear programming methods (Cozman, 2000;
de Campos and Cozman, 2007). However, unfortunately, the size of the required linear programs
is exponential in the size of the network, and therefore, this direct approach only works for small
networks. As a result, it has long been thought that credal networks under epistemic irrelevance are
computationally intractable.
This perception has recently changed, due to some successful algorithmic developments in terms
of lower previsions, which are basically just lower expectations, but with a different interpretation
attached to them. For credal networks under epistemic irrelevance of which the graph is a tree, there
is now a polynomial-time updating algorithm that can compute EirrG (f(Xs) | xT ) for s ∈ G and
T ⊆ G\{s} (de Cooman et al., 2010). This is rather remarkable, especially since the same inference
problem is NP-hard for credal networks under strong (or complete) independence (Maua´ et al.,
2014). Other recent algorithmic developments considered the case of imprecise hidden Markov
models under epistemic irrelevance, the graph of which is again a—special type of—tree (Benavoli
et al., 2011; De Bock and de Cooman, 2014).
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5. Decomposition Properties: Beyond the Special Case of Trees
It is no coincidence that all the recent algorithmic successes with credal networks under epistemic
irrelevance have been obtained for networks whose graph is a tree. Essentially, all of these algo-
rithms are based on the fact that for trees, the irrelevant natural extension satisfies a number of
convenient theoretical properties, which allow for large computational problems to be decomposed
into smaller ones and, as such, enable the development of efficient recursive algorithms; see for
example (de Cooman et al., 2010).
In order to develop efficient algorithms for networks that are more general than trees, an impor-
tant first step is therefore to generalise these theoretical properties from trees to arbitrary directed
acyclic graphs. Recently, it has been shown that this is indeed possible (De Bock and de Cooman,
2013, 2015; De Bock, 2015). However, these generalised properties have been obtained and stated
using sets of desirable gambles, and are therefore rather inaccessible to the general Bayesian net-
work community. In order to remedy this situation, we here present them in a more accessible
format, in terms of lower expectations.
The following property is perhaps the most important one, as it has been—and, no doubt, will
remain to be—the backbone of recursive algorithms.
Proposition 2 Consider any set S ⊆ G, with T := G \ S, such that t @ s for all t ∈ T and s ∈ S.
Then
EirrG (f(XG)) = E
irr
G (E
irr
G (f(XG) |XT )) for all f ∈ G(XG).
Basically, this result is just an extension of the law of iterated expectation, or equivalently, the law
of total probability. For readers that are acquainted with imprecise-probabilistic jargon: this result
establishes marginal extension. An illustration of this perhaps rather abstract property can be found
in the example at the end of this section; see Equation (7).
In order to state the next set of results, we need some additional graph-theoretic concepts, which
are again illustrated in Figure 1. For any subset K of G, we define its set of parents as Π (K) :=
(
⋃
s∈K Π (s)) \ K and let D(K) := (
⋃
s∈K D(s)) \ K be its set of descendants. The set of non-
descendants of K is given by ΠN(K) := G \ (K ∪D(K)), and we also define the set N(K) :=
ΠN(K)\Π (K). IfK is a singleton {s}, these concepts reduce to the simple versions in Section 2.
Finally, we call a subset K of G closed if, for all s, t ∈ K and k ∈ G, s v k v t implies that
k ∈ K.
The following proposition establishes a first crucial property for these closed sets.
Proposition 3 Let K be a closed subset of G. Then for any f ∈ G(XK), xΠ (K) ∈ XΠ (K), h ∈
G(XΠN(K)) and any non-negative g ∈ G(XN(K)):
EirrG
(
h(XΠN(K)) + g(XN(K))IxΠ (K)(XΠ (K))f(XK)
)
= EirrG
(
h(XΠN(K)) + g(XN(K))IxΠ (K)(XΠ (K))E
irr
G (f(XK) | xΠ (K))
)
.
At first sight, this result might seem a bit complicated, but upon closer inspection, it should become
clear that it is in fact not. The essential feature here is that the left hand side is a lower expectation
of a function that depends on all the variables {Xs}s∈G, whereas the right hand side consists of
two separate lower expectations, each of which depends on fewer variables. The following two
corollaries of Proposition 3 highlight this feature even more.
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Corollary 4 (factorisation) LetK be a closed subset ofG. Then for any f ∈ G(XK) and xΠ (K) ∈
XΠ (K) and any non-negative g ∈ G(XN(K)):
EirrG
(
g(XN(K))IxΠ (K)(XΠ (K))f(XK)
)
=
{
EirrG
(
f(XK) | xΠ (K)
)
EirrG
(
g(XN(K))IxΠ (K)(XΠ (K))
)
if EirrG
(
f(XK) | xΠ (K)
) ≥ 0
EirrG
(
f(XK) | xΠ (K)
)
E
irr
G
(
g(XN(K))IxΠ (K)(XΠ (K))
)
if EirrG
(
f(XK) | xΠ (K)
) ≤ 0.
Corollary 5 (external additivity) Let K be a closed subset of G such that Π (k) ⊆ K for all
k ∈ K. Then for any f ∈ G(XK) and h ∈ G(XN(K)):
EirrG
(
h(XN(K)) + f(XK)
)
= EirrG
(
h(XN(K))
)
+ EirrG
(
f(XK)
)
.
A second crucial property for closed sets is that the corresponding so-called sub-network is
closely related to the original network. However, before we can formally state this result, we first
need to explain what we mean by a sub-network.
With any subset K of G and any fixed value xΠ (K) of XΠ (K), we associate a new credal
network, called sub-network. The graph of this sub-network is obtained from the original graph by
simply removing the nodes that do not belong to K and the arrows that enter these nodes or depart
from these nodes. For example, in Figure 1, the sub-graph that corresponds to K := {r, s, u} is
highlighted by means of thicker lines. The local credal sets of the sub-network are equal to the
original ones. However, this is not immediate: as illustrated in Figure 1, a node s ∈ K might have a
parent t that does not belong to the sub-graph of K. For this reason, in order to obtain local models
that only depend on parents that belong to K, we fix the value xt of Xt for any t ∈ G \K that has
a child in K, or equivalently, we fix the value xΠ (K) of XΠ (K).
For any choice of K ⊆ G and xΠ (K), the corresponding sub-network, like any credal network,
has an irrelevant natural extension. We will denote this irrelevant natural extension by F irrK|xΠ (K)
and will use EirrK|xΠ (K) to refer to the corresponding lower expectations. If K is closed, these lower
expectations satisfy the following property.
Proposition 6 Consider any closed subset K of G and any xΠ (K) ∈ XΠ (K). Then
EirrG
(
f(XK) |BK , xΠ (K), BN(K)
)
= EirrK|xΠ (K)
(
f(XK) |BK
)
= EirrG
(
f(XK) |BK , xΠ (K)
)
for all f ∈ G(XK), BK ∈ P∅(XK) and BN(K) ∈ P∅(XN(K)).
The crucial feature of this result is that it allows us to reduce an optimisation problem in the
original credal network into a similar but smaller-sized optimisation problem in one of its sub-
networks. Propositions 2 and 3 and the corollaries of the latter can then again be applied to these
sub-networks, and by continuing in this way, it is possible to reduce large optimisation problems to
a combination of multiple small ones, thereby allowing for tractable computations. The following
example illustrates how this works for a very simple inference problem. More involved examples
can be found in (De Bock, 2015).
Example 1 Suppose that we are interested in computingEirrG
(
α(Xr)+β(Xw)
)
for a credal network
whose graph is depicted in Figure 1, with α(Xr) and β(Xw) real-valued functions of Xr and Xw,
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respectively. Proposition 6 then allows us to reduce this problem to a similar problem in a much
smaller network: since G′ = {w, r, q} is a closed subset of G, we find that
EirrG
(
α(Xr) + β(Xw)
)
= EirrG′
(
α(Xr) + β(Xw)
)
,
where EirrG′ is the lower expectation operator of a credal network with only three nodes (w, r and q)
and a single edge (q → r). Furthermore, because of Corollary 5, we also find that
EirrG′
(
α(Xr) + β(Xw)
)
= EirrG′
(
α(Xr)
)
+ EirrG′
(
β(Xw)
)
.
The two terms in this sum can now be simplified even more, because Proposition 6 implies that
EirrG′
(
α(Xr)
)
= EirrG′′
(
α(Xr)
)
and EirrG′
(
β(Xw)
)
= Eirrw
(
β(Xw)
)
,
with G′′ := {r, q}. Hence, we have managed to reduce our original problem to two smaller prob-
lems: computing EirrG′′
(
α(Xr)
)
and Eirrw
(
β(Xw)
)
. Computing Eirrw
(
β(Xw)
)
is trivial, because it
corresponds to a network with a single node w. For Eirrw
(
β(Xw)
)
, Proposition 2 implies that
EirrG′′
(
α(Xr)
)
= EirrG′′
(
EirrG′′
(
α(Xr) |Xq
))
= EirrG′′
(
γ(Xq)
)
, (7)
where we let γ(Xq) := EirrG′′
(
α(Xr) |Xq
)
. The last simplifying step now consists in a final appli-
cation of Proposition 6, from wich we infer that
EirrG′′
(
γ(Xq)
)
= Eirrq
(
γ(Xq)
)
and (∀xq ∈ Xq) γ(xq) = Eirrr|xq
(
ψ(Xr)
)
.
As before, computing Eirrq
(
γ(Xq)
)
and Eirrr|xq
(
ψ(Xr)
)
is trivial, because each of these problems
corresponds to a network with a single node. The original problem has therefore been reduced to
several smaller problems, each of which requires only local optimisations.
6. Epistemic h-irrelevance, AD-separation and Graphoid Axioms
As the reader may have noticed, the second equality in Proposition 6 is redundant: it follows from
the first equality by choosingBN(K) = XN(K). The reason why we nevertheless state it explicitly, is
because it illustrates that the irrelevant natural extension satisfies many more epistemic irrelevances
than the basic ones that were used to define it in Equation (4). In fact, it even satisfies statements of
epistemic h-irrelevance.
Definition 7 (Cozman, 2013) For three pairwise disjoint sets I, S, C ⊆ G, we say that XI is (epis-
temically) h-irrelevant to XS conditional on XC , and write HIR(I, S | C), if
EirrG
(
f(XS) |BS , xC , BI
)
= EirrG
(
f(XS) |BS , xC
)
for all f ∈ G(XS), BS ∈ P∅(XS), xC ∈ XC and BI ∈ P∅(XI).
Indeed, Proposition 6 clearly implies that for any closed subset K of G, XN(K) is epistemically
h-irrelevant to XK conditional on XΠ (K): HIR(N(K),K | Π (K)).
This statement of epistemic h-irrelevance is similar to the assessment of epistemic irrelevance
that was imposed in Equation (4)—for S = {s}, C = Π (s) and I = N(s)—but differs on several
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levels. First of all: it is stated in terms of lower expectations, whereas Equation (4) was stated in
terms of sets of probabilities. However, this is not so important; epistemic h-irrelevance can also be
defined in terms of sets of probabilities (De Bock, 2015). What really sets epistemic h-irrelevance
apart from epistemic irrelevance is that is far more powerful when it comes to conditional models.
Unlike epistemic irrelevance, as can be seen from Definition 7, epistemic h-irrelevance requires all
information about the value of XI—including partial information—to be irrelevant to all beliefs
about XS—conditional and unconditional beliefs—conditional on the value of XC .
As it turns out, the irrelevant natural extension satisfies many more statements of epistemic
h-irrelevance than the ones that are implied by Proposition 6. Similarly to how for a Bayesian
network, the well-known d-separation criterion implies stochastic independence, for the irrelevant
natural extension, the so-called AD-separation criterion (De Bock, 2015; De Bock and de Cooman,
2015) implies epistemic h-irrelevance.
Definition 8 For any pairwise disjoint sets I, S, C ⊆ G, we say that I is AD-separated from S by
C, and write AD(I, S | C), if there is some closed subset K of G such that S ⊆ K, Π (K) ⊆ C,
I ⊆ N(K) and D(K) ∩ C = ∅.
Proposition 9 For any pairwise disjoint sets I, S, C ⊆ G such that AD(I, S | C), the irrelevant
natural extension EirrG satisfies HIR(I, S | C).
As a simple illustration of AD-separation, consider for example the sets I = {p, w}, S = {r, u}
and C = {s, q, t}. Then for the DAG in Figure 1, by applying Definition 8 for K = {r, s, u}, we
find that I is AD-separated from S by C.
The Bayesian network counterpart of Proposition 9—with AD-separation and epistemic h-
irrelevance replaced by d-separation and stochastic independence—is proved by exploiting the fact
that stochastic independence satisfies various graphoid properties (symmetry, redundancy, decom-
position,weak union, contraction and intersection). Therefore, since epistemic irrelevance fails
some of these graphoid properties (Cozman and Walley, 2005), it has long been thought that a
similar result would not hold for credal networks under epistemic irrelevance. However, as Propo-
sition 9 shows, it is nevertheless possible to prove such a result. In order to do so, two steps were
essential. The first step was to drop the symmetry of the separation criterion; since epistemic irrel-
evance is asymmetric, symmetry is not to be expected anyway. The ‘A’ in AD-separation is short
for ‘asymmetric’, and it can be shown that Definition 8 is indeed a proper asymmetrical version of
d-separation (De Bock, 2015). The second step was to not focus on graphoid properties, but use
other means to prove separation; for Propositions 6 and 9—the proof of the latter is heavily based
on the former—these means were sets of desirable gambles (De Bock and de Cooman, 2015).
The fact that Proposition 9 can be proven without the use of graphoid properties illustrates
nicely that these properties are not essential, and that the fact that a notion of independence—such
as epistemic irrelevance—fails some of them, should not be regarded as problematic. In fact, I
think that the common practice of regarding these properties as axioms, and of comparing different
notions of independence by means of the graphoid axioms that they satisfy, is flawed. Of course,
when they are satisfied, graphoid properties are important and useful. However, one should be very
careful in regarding them as axioms. For example, if we were to impose on epistemic h-irrelevance
an asymmetric version of the ‘axiom’ of contraction, it would require that(
HIR(I, S | C) and HIR(I,W | C ∪ S))⇒ HIR(I, S ∪W | C) (8)
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If we choose C = ∅ here, then basically, this property requires that if XI is irrelevant to our
beliefs about XS and irrelevant to our conditional beliefs about XW given XS , then XI should
also be irrelevant to our joint beliefs about XS∪W . I do not consider it reasonable to enforce this,
because essentially, it requires that our beliefs about XS∪W should be completely determined by
our beliefs about XS and our conditional beliefs about XW given XS . For probabilities, this is
trivially true—under strict positivity assumptions—because it follows from Bayes’s rule. However,
for more general belief models, such as sets of probabilities, it is well known that this is not always
the case. I think that this is perfectly normal, and that there is no fundamental reason why such a
property should be enforced. For that reason, I consider it unreasonable to regard contraction as an
axiom, at least not in general. A similar argument can be used to question the axiomatic status of
the intersection property.
7. Conclusions and a Brief Look Beyond the Horizon
This paper has established two things. On the one hand, it has shown that full conditional probability
measures can be used to develop a rigorous yet simple definition of a credal network under epistemic
irrelevance and its irrelevant natural extension. On the other hand, it has shown that such a network
satisfies many powerful theoretical properties, which can be used to develop efficient computational
methods that decompose large optimisation problems into multiple smaller ones.
Using these results as a starting point, the first important future step is now to develop efficient
algorithms for credal networks whose graph is more general than a tree. For some types of graphs—
including but not limited to trees—examples of such algorithms can already be found in (De Bock,
2015, Chapter 7). However, for other types of graphs, the search for efficient algorithms remains
open. Since the existing algorithms all focus on exact computations, approximate algorithms would
definitely be worth exploring too.
The next step would then be to apply credal networks under epistemic irrelevance to real ap-
plications, in situations where the defining assumptions of a Bayesian network—exactly specified
probabilities and exact independence assessments—are unrealistic. In principle, this is already fea-
sible now: the algorithms in (De Bock, 2015) should already allow practitioners to solve large
classes of problems that are relevant to their applications. However, in practice, two additional steps
are needed. First of all, it is necessary to implement existing and/or new algorithms, and to develop
user-friendly software to compute with them; no such software currently exists. Secondly, it should
be thoroughly tested whether the bounds that are computed by these algorithms are informative
enough to be useful in practice. Since epistemic irrelevance imposes less stringent constraints than
complete or strong independence, the bounds of a credal network under epistemic irrelevance will
be more conservative than those that correspond to other types of credal networks, and possibly too
conservative to be of practical use. Although this type of behaviour does not occur in the proofs of
concept in (De Bock and de Cooman, 2014; Benavoli et al., 2011), it remains to be seen whether
this will be the case in other applications as well.
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